Testimony Before the Us-china Economic and Security Review Commission on the Plaã¢â‚¬â„¢s

Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, manager of USIP's Asia-Pacific Programs, testifies before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on Cathay'due south Relations with North Korea.

Commissioner Brookes and Commissioner Fiedler, and other distinguished members of the Commission: Thank you for your invitation to testify before you lot today on the topic of China's relations with North Korea. The views I express today are my ain and do not necessarily stand for those of the U.Southward. Institute of Peace, which does not take policy positions.

U.s. policy towards North korea aims at securing verifiable steps toward denuclearization, which Cathay says information technology wants, too. The U.S. believes that the best way to achieve this is to increase pressure level on Pyongyang through targeted financial measures and conditional date. Beijing disagrees.  It argues that Pyongyang needs security assurances and encouragement for economical reform, and that someday, these might produce a willingness on Pyongyang'due south function to give upward its nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang's nuclear stockpile continues to expand, the North continues to ameliorate its missile delivery systems, the danger of weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) exports grows, and the threat to U.S. allies increases. Ane year later the Sunnylands Summit and prior to an expected quaternary North Korean nuclear test it is important to ascertain whether, and to what extent, China is actually willing to help resolve the N Korea nuclear problem. What are Chinese priorities towards North Korea? Have Chinese perceptions of North korea changed since the tertiary nuclear test? How does North korea factor into Beijing's perception of its own security? To what extent does the U.S.-China relationship touch China's Democratic people's republic of korea policy? Is there any convergence in Washington and Beijing's strategic goals, priorities and tools for dealing with North Korea? What does this mean for future U.S. policy? After seeking to answer these questions, my testimony concludes that the idea that China can and will compel Pyongyang to surrender its nuclear weapons cannot exist the ground for a sound U.South. policy.

Mainland china'due south perspective on denuclearization

Following Democratic people's republic of korea's 3rd nuclear test in Feb 2013, Western officials and analysts interpreted Xi Jinping's accent on denuclearization – including in his Pinnacle meeting with President Obama at Sunnylands – as a sign of a policy shift and greater alignment betwixt U.S. and Chinese national interests.1 Eager to promote the prospect of gains for the U.s. from meliorate relations with Beijing, Chinese diplomats have sometimes sought to reinforce that impression. But this shift in rhetoric did not result in Communist china's re-ordering of priorities, nor did it translate into measures to printing North korea to denuclearize. 2 While Prc does not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons, it wants instability on its periphery even less.

From Beijing'south perspective, denuclearization is a long-term endeavor, which outset requires Pyongyang to receive security assurances that create stability around it.3 Chinese conventional wisdom holds that no amount of force per unit area will induce Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program without fundamental concessions from the U.South. Even when Chinese analysts4 believe that North Korea's weapon procurement activities threaten to undermine People's republic of china's strategic interests, many in Beijing believe that North korea is simply trying to guarantee its security in the face of external threats from the U.Southward. Therefore, Chinese analysts believe it is up to Washington to accost the root cause of the North Korea nuclear trouble by easing Pyongyang's security concerns; they say, "The one who ties the knot is responsible for untying information technology (解铃还需系铃人)."5 The types of concessions include: diplomatic normalization, a peace treaty, and the lifting of sanctions – none of which are likely.6 Without these concessions, Beijing argues that imposing punishing pressure on North Korea to denuclearize would weaken the government and decrease stability – the proposed solution would make the master problem worse. Instead Chinese officials have recommended that the U.Due south. offset focus on nonproliferation or a testing moratorium.7

Red china prioritizes stability over denuclearization because of a vastly different perception than the U.South. of the threat posed by a nuclear North korea.8 While North korea's nuclear tests and other nuclear developments are viewed in China every bit inimical to its national interests and regional security and stability, Beijing does non run across North Korea's actions as direct targeting China. Beijing's biggest worries are the possibility of military confrontation between N Korea and the U.S., authorities collapse, or North Korean reunification with South korea leading to a U.S. military presence north of the 38th parallel. Beijing besides worries that collapse or Korean unification could lead to unrest among the over one million ethnic Koreans in its northeastern provinces, which would be aggravated through a flood of refugees. At that place are besides concerns that a reunified Korea could make territorial claims on China'southward Yanbian region based on the boundaries of the ancient Korean kingdom of Korguryo, which extends into present-day China. In the minds of leaders in Beijing, back up for Pyongyang helps to ensure a friendly nation on People's republic of china's northeastern border, and provides a buffer zone between it and democratic South Korea, which is home to 28,500 U.S. troops. While Beijing would prefer that North korea renounce its nuclear program, information technology tin more than easily stomach a de facto nuclear Northward Korea strategically aligned with Beijing than state of war or collapse. The execution of Jang Song-Thaek, the husband of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un'southward aunt known for his close ties to Prc, only exacerbated Chinese concerns about the viability of the Kim regime, making it more than balky to punitive measures. Beijing has since asserted that the regime is again "stable," the purge having helped Kim Jong-un solidify his position, with an improving economical and food state of affairs.9 Yet Beijing continues to shield North Korea from stronger economical sanctions and other more punitive measures.

China sees the nuclear issue as simply ane component of its broader bilateral human relationship with N Korea10, which is based on a policy of sustaining the country and seeking to integrate it more fully into the globe economic system.11 Chinese officials describe economical engagement every bit function of a long-term procedure that will ultimately alter North Korea'south strategic calculus regarding the office of nuclear weapons.12 China believes that its own "opening and reform" experience offers Democratic people's republic of korea an example of how such a process increases the likelihood of state and Party survival.

But after three decades of coaxing Pyongyang to implement economic reform, including inviting all iii Kims to tour Communist china's special economical zones, there are no signs that N Korea has been willing to undertake structural reforms to spur genuine national economic growth. Kim Jong Il feared that instead of leading to Chinese-fashion economic growth, reform in Democratic people's republic of korea would engender an East German language-style collapse. Kim Jong-un has shown himself to be only as resistant to economic reform every bit his predecessors.xiii

Promoting economical exchange with North korea is as well integral to Beijing's policy to ensure stability and economic evolution in its Northeast "rust chugalug" region of 100 million people, where high unemployment and inequality has been a source of past unrest. In big part due to Prc, including startling growth in bilateral trade, Due north Korea's economy continues to show steady improvement since 2009.14

Beijing also arguably maintains an interest in the survival of the N Korean authorities for its ain domestic legitimacy. As 11 works to bolster the Communist Political party's standing through an aggressive anti-abuse campaign and economic reform plans, he would hardly welcome a global spotlight—or worse, Chinese public attention—on the failure of a communist government next door. Collapse across the border of a authorities that China fought to preserve at the toll of hundreds of thousands of lives, including the son of the Cathay's founding leader, Mao Zedong, might crusade the Chinese public to further probe its own regime, especially at a time when liberal intellectuals have called for political reform alongside Xi's ambitious economic changes. 15

Compounding Prc'due south reluctance to turn against North korea is the growing demand by Asian coastal states for a stronger U.S. role in the region (primarily due to Chinese assertiveness in maritime disputes); and the perceived "fall" of Burma/Myanmar to Western political values (a state which not long ago counted Cathay every bit its but friend). Mainland china doesn't want to be surrounded by countries that have transitioned into Western-friendly regimes. So while the value of North korea as a military buffer against the U.S. and its allies—in the age of long-range strike capabilities and U.S. naval authority—can be debated, North korea'southward viability is even so politically important to Beijing.

Ultimately, equally Chinese officials publicly bespeak willingness to cooperate with the U.s.a., they privately say that there is not much Beijing is willing or able to do to curtail North Korea'south nuclear weapons plan. Beijing still does not want—nor does it feel able within the confines of its policy of "no instability" and "no regime alter"—to implement punitive measures that might push North korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons or to withdraw its economical safety internet. Indeed, the belief is that such attempts could subtract stability and brand the situation worse.

Beijing's threat perception

Despite longstanding historical and ideological ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, in that location isn't much amore left between the two nations. North korea remains highly suspicious of Communist china and resents its larger neighbor the more it depends on information technology for survival. North Koreans believe Beijing has betrayed the communist cause by turning capitalist and making deals with the West. As a result of this distrust, Democratic people's republic of korea doesn't fifty-fifty let Red china, a defence treaty marry, to observe its military exercises.

Beijing grudgingly tolerates its wayward neighbor, which it sees equally both a strategic liability and an nugget—a necessary evil. It perceives the relationship every bit ane between a patron and client where the client is unruly and ungrateful. Co-ordinate to Communist china'due south hierarchical view of international relations, smaller powers should cede to its will.sixteen Pyongyang doesn't. Only larger geopolitical calculations—in which the U.S. is central—dictate that China'due south interest in maintaining the North Korean regime and a divided peninsula is non contingent on good relations with Pyongyang.

Chinese mistrust of the U.S. is the primary obstacle to cooperation with the United States on North korea. China's agreement of American motives is the primary determinant of Chinese decisions nigh how to evaluate and respond to North Korean threats.17 When China looks at Democratic people's republic of korea, it does then through an East Asian strategic lens with growing rivalry with the United States equally the focal point. Despite its interests beingness seriously harmed by North Korean behavior, Beijing believes that Washington and its allies pose a larger threat to People's republic of china'southward strategic interests than Pyongyang does. Consensus amongst analysts in Beijing is that the U.S.-led bloc is using North korea and tensions in the South and E Prc Seas as excuses to deepen the Asia rebalance, strengthen regional alliances, expand armed services exercises and motility missile defense force and armed services assets to the region. China is increasingly uncomfortable with long-standing U.S. defense relationships with countries around China'southward periphery (including Due south Korea, Nippon, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyz republic).18  From the Chinese perspective, China-North korea relations are intrinsically part of Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition in East asia.19 As long as China continues to view the U.Due south. with such strategic mistrust and suspicion, a fundamental shift in its policy toward North korea remains unlikely.

Chinese policymakers believe that Washington's rigid policy towards Northward Korea and its military machine deployments and exercises are as much to blame for instability in the region as North korea's intransigence, and actually exacerbate the threat of nuclear proliferation.xx Following Democratic people's republic of korea'southward sinking of the South Korean naval vessel the Cheonan on 26 March 2010 and the shelling of South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010 China's initial reaction was to dismiss international calls to pressure North Korea and instead criticize the U.S. and South Korea for the military machine exercises held in response, which it viewed as a more serious threat to both its ain and regional security than the North Korean provocations. 21

Many Chinese analysts worry more than well-nigh another Northward Korean conventional attack on South Korea than a nuclear test. Not only exercise they believe that a conventional provocation has a college likelihood of sparking disharmonize now than in 2010, but given their conventionalities that the ultimate U.S. aim is to change the regime in Due north Korea, a provocation could exist used past Washington to reach this.

Underneath all of this, Chinese diplomats worry that Democratic people's republic of korea will plough on them by cutting a bargain with Washington, or at least thaw relations, which could pb to a hostile state on the border aligned with the U.Southward. Especially since the downturn in China-Democratic people's republic of korea ties, China is concerned that applying pressure could backlash, with Due north Korea deciding to employ the U.S. or other countries to plot a grade independent from Beijing.22 One Chinese analyst said that because of the division of labor in dealing with North Korea where Prc plays "good cop" to the U.S. "bad cop," at that place was concern about the reaction Beijing would go if China also turned into a bad cop.23

In part for this reason, China has expended significant diplomatic energy trying to revive the moribund Six Party Talks, which last convened in 2008. While Western diplomats had hoped the procedure would ensure that China would exert pressure on North korea to alter form, Beijing had different hopes. China prioritized the talks because as Chair, it was guaranteed a primal role in setting international policy toward the DPRK. Beijing never expected that the talks would resolve the issue, rather, the process kept negotiations open and lessened the possibility of crises escalating, while allowing Beijing to exert control over the international response by ensuring interaction with and influence over all parties. According to a senior MOFA official, Prc'south primary goal with the Six-Party Talks was to "keep them talking and non fighting." China too used the talks every bit a forum to blame other countries' policies, South Korean domestic politics or the Japanese focus on the abduction issue, for the failure to rein in Pyongyang.24

Chinese analysts joke that the names of the ii summit officials responsible for the Half dozen Political party Talks, Wu Dawei (武大伟), and Xu Bu (徐步), are homonyms in Mandarin for "no big movement" (无大为) and "ho-hum steps" (徐步). In one decade of the process, the DPRK conducted two underground nuclear tests, 4 long-range missile flying tests, torpedoed a South Korean naval patrol boat and shelled a South Korean island, without ever losing People's republic of china's political and economic support.
Ane of the main motivations for Beijing to go tough with Pyongyang is concern most U.South. "shows of force" such as B-2 and B-52 flights over Republic of korea, combined exercises with allies, and missile defense force measures. The U.S.' taking these deportment has been successful in getting Beijing to hold to express sanctions and to take other tactical measures following Pyongyang's provocations. Simply they besides reinforce the suspicion that the U.Southward. is using tensions on the Peninsula equally a justification to expand its regional military presence. Given Chinese strategic culture and the perspectives shaping Chinese understanding of U.South. policy, Chinese analysts are prone to interpret American actions nigh anywhere in the earth as secretly directed against Red china.25

Chinese experts also view other countries' renunciation of their nuclear-weapon pursuits at the hands of the U.S. as tantamount to government change and collapse.26 In support of this view, they frequently cite the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the North Atlantic Treaty Arrangement (NATO) operation in Libya in March 2011. Since the Ukraine crisis, Chinese analysts regularly invoke that example as further evidence that the model of security for disarmament is a failure.27

Moreover, Chinese analysts say that Washington's handling of Ukraine is bear witness of the relative weakening of U.Southward. power. This fits with a general perception in Beijing that a U.S. decline is happening faster than they expected, while Cathay's rise is faster than predictable.28 As such, China feels more than confident in resisting pressure from Washington on Northward Korea than just a few years ago. This combines with Xi Jinping'due south more than active role in defending Chinese interests around the earth than his predecessors. Chinese analysts say that Beijing volition go on to challenge whatever constitutes Washington'due south "carmine line" in East asia, hoping to change information technology gradually past testing American focus and resolve. All of which gives Democratic people's republic of korea more breathing room.

At the same fourth dimension, many in Beijing accept come to believe that the U.South. is willing to alive with a nuclear-armed North Korea. Later President Obama declared a "reddish line" on chemical weapons in Syria, Chinese strategists speculated virtually what a like crimson line might constitute in N Korea. Their guesses varied from proliferation to miniaturization capability. Co-ordinate to one analyst, "so far the Obama administration has achieved nix towards the goal of denuclearization. If I were Democratic people's republic of korea, judging from the cases of Great socialist people's libyan arab jamahiriya, Syria, or Ukraine, my thought is that that I would still accept a 4th or 5th chance."30 Chinese analysts have dubbed "strategic patience" equally "strategic ignorance." Still China is more comfortable living with this than any harder-line strategy, as it gives the appearance that Beijing is cooperating with the U.Due south. past engaging in dialogue, supporting UN resolutions and publicly rebuking Pyongyang from time to fourth dimension.

People's republic of china besides tries to make use of North Korean beliefs to increment its leverage over the U.S. and ROK and its influence in the UN.31 Chinese strategists regularly question whether the U.Southward. would consider trading back up for regional allies embroiled with China in maritime sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas—Prc's acme foreign policy challenges—in commutation for more cooperation on N Korea.32 If the U.S. continues to try to "comprise China," ane analyst stated, Beijing will experience less "encouraged" to be tough with Pyongyang.33 With reference to President Obama'due south Apr 2014 trip to Japan and the Philippines, another analyst said, "If yous really desire Cathay to focus on the DPRK nuclear issue you need to exist quiet in criticizing China on every single island issue. Mainland china has a policy of dealing with those islands with the relevant countries, not with U.S. involvement."34 At the same time, Communist china is so preoccupied with disappointment Japan—with its U.S. brotherhood—that coaxing North Korea into concessions recedes in comparing as a regional priority.

New tactics, erstwhile strategy

Beijing was angry and disappointed with Pyongyang following the space launches and third nuclear examination in 2013. Leaders were surprised by the suddenness and volume of Kim Jong-un's threats, specially when compared with his more calculating father. Beijing interpreted North korea's acts every bit a "slap in the face" given its efforts at the time to restart the Six Party Talks equally well its stern warnings issued to the Northward not to proceed. Adding to this was fear that the examination would invite U.S. interest, and the fact that the timing couldn't have been worse: during Beijing'southward one time-in-a-decade leadership transition, which saw signs of fierce factional struggles.35 The leadership needed to spend fourth dimension on domestic bug equally opposed to international crises, and it was already in the midst of a major crisis with Nippon over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Moreover, the third nuclear test took place during the Chinese New year's day, the country's about important holiday, when officials try to take their longest vacation of the year.

Beijing therefore felt it had to answer strongly. It issued robust warnings; emphasized the importance of denuclearization; demonstrated solidarity with South korea; supported tightened UN Security Quango sanctions, devoted meaning energy to resuming the 6 Party Talks, and allowed another vibrant internal debate on Democratic people's republic of korea.36 Chinese diplomats openly vented their frustration with U.S. diplomats.37

There were too more open up conversations in Beijing nigh North Korean provocative behavior and how to deal with information technology. There was a more concentrated search than in earlier years for more effective instruments to restrain Due north Korea, by exploring unlike ways of encouraging Pyongyang to autumn into line. But no consensus was reached on viable options that might produce results without risking a modify to the status quo, which was seen equally worse.

In the finish, China'southward moves remained tactical, short-term and reactive, aimed at trying to rein in Pyongyang's provocations and bring it back to talks, every bit opposed to decisive punitive steps with a view to bringing most denuclearization. These tactical adjustments were termed by analysts as, "meting out rewards and punishment accordingly" (奖惩分明). Mainland china's motive was to convey disappointment with Pyongyang in order to deter further provocations, which it believed could drive the U.S. to upgrade regional missile defence force deployments and step upwards armed forces exercises in the region. Western analysts interpreted Chinese moves—specially the more strident rhetoric and internal debate—equally a sign that the Mainland china was moving closer to the U.S. position. Only these were not accompanied by whatsoever broader shift in policy or strategic priorities. Chinese analysts explained Xi's sterner rhetoric was due to his bolder and blunter manner: a "modify of leadership style rather than policy."38

After reacting to the 3rd nuclear test, Beijing shortly fell back on its usual playbook: once Pyongyang walked back its hostile rhetoric, People's republic of china tried to coffin it every bit quickly equally possible past playing upwards non-threatening DPRK activeness as a positive stride forrard. Beijing appealed to the United states of america to loosen weather for returning to talks with Pyongyang. President Xi Jinping then angered the U.S. past dispatching Vice-President Li Yuanchao to Pyongyang in July 2013 where he attended N Korea'due south military parade marking the 60th anniversary of the stop of Korean War.39 The presence of such a high-level Chinese official next to Kim Jong-un on the podium inspecting parading soldiers and a missile arsenal while Pyongyang celebrated victory in the Korean War was a strong symbol—especially so before long after the 3rd nuclear test. The decision showed that Communist china'south pique over North Korea'due south deportment before in the year didn't preclude it from moving relatively quickly again to shore up the bilateral relationship.

Internal debates and the actors who decide their issue

While the fundamentals of Beijing'south Due north Korean policy remain unchanged, there are a greater variety of views on Democratic people's republic of korea now than before. Robust internal debates take place between those proposing a stronger line against Pyongyang and those who support the continuation of substantial political and economical support. Signs of such discussions were evident after the first nuclear examination in 2006, with another debate following the 2009 provocations, and once again following the 2013 nuclear test. Although many in the West bespeak to these debates as a sign of a policy shift, Beijing's basic strategic calculations remain unchanged. As one high-level Chinese diplomat said during the 2009 argue, "Our mindset has changed, merely the length of our border has not."40 The 2009 contend ended with then-Premier Wen Jiabao's  "goodwill trip" to North korea to mark the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic relations on 4 Oct 2009, when he brought a high-powered delegation with a wide range of opportunities for economic engagement with nary a mention of the denuclearization result.41

A notable difference between the 2009 and 2013 debates was increased criticism of the U.S. in 2013, with more voices critiquing the Chinese government for permitting a situation in which the U.S. could utilise North korea to strengthen its armed services presence around China.

At that place are several reasons for the continuing gap betwixt domestic criticism and government policy on North Korea. Space for media, experts and academics to contend has been expanding, peculiarly for those in the 'abandonment school' who are ofttimes liberal intellectuals and academics who take more than freedom to speak than those directly involved in policy.42

Indeed, despite the increased internal criticism of North korea, traditional voices and institutions continue to dominate authorities policy thinking. One institution that exerts meaning influence on North korea policy is the People'south Liberation Army (PLA)—whose shared military history with the land and distrust of U.S. military power makes information technology a supporter of the traditional line. Even though the PLA has frustrations with N Korea—exemplified by the fact that it is not permitted to notice exercises of the Korean People'due south Army—the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Assist and Cooperation Friendship Treaty remains intact. Assuming that recent reports well-nigh leaked Chinese military machine contingency plans for North Korea are real, it is not surprising that they make reference to how North Korean political and armed forces leaders should be given protection from some other "military power" (the U.Southward.).43

The Communist Political party of Red china'due south (CPC) Central Committee's International Liaison Department (ILD), in charge of party-to-party diplomacy44, has also played a central office in Northward Korean policy-making.45 While it used to exist the principal facilitator of relations with North Korea, relations between the ILD and Korean Workers Party have been strained.46 There has also been an attempt to achieve "normal state-to-state relations" past having the relationship managed through the Ministry of Strange Affairs (MFA).47 The more moderate Ministry is generally relegated to a more subordinate, implementation role, and thrusting it into a more prominent role in relations with Democratic people's republic of korea does non seem to have reaped any ameliorate results.  Officials privately lament that the MFA doesn't take the necessary channels or access, certainly nothing on par with the ILD, making it difficult to engage in effective diplomacy with Pyongyang. All of these actors furthermore operate in an environment characterized by consensus decision-making and bureaucratic inertia.

Finally, frustration with North korea generally reflects a generational divide, with younger persons taking to the Internet with stark criticism while older, more than conservative citizens still dominate policy circles. Given that China's youth overwhelmingly view their neighbor with compassion and contempt, i cannot dominion out these opinions altering future policy. But for now, there is notwithstanding a significant gap between how Chinese people experience about Democratic people's republic of korea and what their authorities is willing to practise.

Policy tools: economic appointment over sanctions

In addition to difference in strategic approach, the U.S. and China differ in their preferred tools to promote Due north Korean nuclear disarmament. Whereas Washington sees diplomatic isolation, economical sanctions and deterrence as essential, Beijing sees diplomatic engagement and dialogue, economical cooperation and security assurances every bit the preferred ways to induce a modify of mindset in Pyongyang, which could pb to denuclearization in the long term.

Beijing engages in a balancing deed in the UN, supporting sanctions in the hope that they might restrain the U.South. and its allies and encourage North Korea to return to talks; while at the same time negotiating to weaken the sanctions to mitigate damage to the North Korean regime.48 This effort has involved long hours of negotiation over loopholes, clauses limiting the scope of inspections, and cleave-outs to preclude disruption to commercial activities and economical linkages.49 Beijing likewise consistently emphasizes that implementation must exist proportionate, moderate and aimed just at bringing the sides dorsum to talks, non at undermining or weakening the regime.50 Red china's dislike of sanctions partly derives from its own experience of being the object of them.51

People's republic of china's implementation record has been underwhelming not simply throughout the history of UN sanctions against North Korea52, but even after UNSC Resolution 2094 (2013) which Chinese officials privately admitted was the first sanctions resolution they were making a genuine try to implement.53 According to a Western diplomat, the Chinese implement sanctions "to the letter" but not the spirit of the resolutions.54 In cases where Beijing has taken high-visibility measures—such as issuing of a listing of banned "dual-apply" exports to North Korea—Chinese diplomats take been after unwilling or unable to provide evidence of implementation, despite repeated requests. And the widely touted 7 May 2013 Bank of China closure of North Korean Foreign Trade Banking concern (FTB) accounts was more symbolic than substantive. 55 The motion had not been ordered past the authorities, other state-endemic financial institutions did non act similarly, and almost all financial transactions were already beingness undertaken outside major Chinese banks through third countries, Chinese local banks, or by skirting the banking system birthday. Bank of China had previously severed interaction with Democratic people's republic of korea in 2005 after the Banco Delta Asia activity and meetings with U.S. officials.56 Nor did Beijing interpret the FTB equally a target under Resolution 2094, only rather the bank was formally sanctioned by the U.Due south. Treasury via Executive Order 13382, which froze its assets in the U.S. and prohibited U.S.-based entities from transacting with information technology.57

With regard to bilateral economic relations, sanctions have driven business more underground in a grayness market that is difficult to track. Chinese private firms have been expanding their interactions with Due north Korean land trading companies within of People's republic of china's national economy, improving the commercial well existence of North Korean government elites back in Pyongyang. These Chinese private firms have significantly bolstered Pyongyang'due south power to procure dual-utilize components.58

Recommendations

Because Beijing and Washington have such divergent viewpoints and priorities, in that location seems little likelihood of achieving common policies toward Northward Korea. China shares neither the U.S. priority on denuclearization nor its desire to accomplish peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Pressure from the The states is non likely to change the fundamentals of China'due south policy. The idea that Red china can and will hogtie Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be the basis for sound U.South. policy.

The basic choice for U.South. policymakers is therefore between trying to change China's perception of its self interest and attempting to find a more collaborative arroyo that exploits the advantages of People's republic of china's engagement efforts and U.Southward.-led multilateral pressure. It is possible for the U.S. to raise the stakes on Beijing for failing to bring more pressure to touch Pyongyang. Simply given the bang-up number of strategically of import problems on which U.Southward. and Chinese cooperation is essential, it would not be wise to push button the bilateral relationship to the breaking point in an try to bring near a cardinal modify in Beijing'south approach.

Fortunately, it should be possible to get Mainland china to do more on the coercive side of the equation while withal accepting that Chinese and U.Due south. approaches to the goal of denuclearization will inevitably differ.

• The U.S. should be able to persuade Communist china to human activity more strongly to deter or respond to any new DPRK long-range missile launches or nuclear tests. Beijing might concur, for case, to some new increase of punishment later on whatever nuclear test, ballistic missile flying-test or space launch. The U.S. could unilaterally complement such Chinese moves past strengthening enforcement of export controls on dual-use items and other targeted sanctions.
• U.S. legislation that imposes "Iran-mode" sanctions confronting firms that practise business organisation with North Korean entities that have been found to be engaging in the transfer of items and technology that could support North korea's missile program ballistic missile merchandise, besides as the banks that makes those business transactions is besides possible. Even absent additional legislation, the U.Southward. has a range of existing measures and authorities that it has not fully implemented against Pyongyang.59 Targeted financial measures are largely self-executing; responses are quick and require little additional official pressure level. Banks and businesses go reluctant to engage with Democratic people's republic of korea for fearfulness of their own reputation and losing admission to the U.S. banking system. The President has the dominance to dramatically expand the range of banks and companies deemed of "special business organisation" for money laundering purposes; this in turn would generate uncertainty for all companies dealing with those entities and banks in item.
• China holds the key to implementing sanctions on North korea. The U.South. should consider pushing back when China does non evangelize on both the letter and spirit of existing sanctions, by more publicly pushing China to enforce sanctions. When the U.S. starts with a list of twoscore entities to sanction and Beijing eventually agrees to three, Washington could choose to signal out the gap and work with other countries to try to sanction those entities, rather than declare victory.  Washington could too increase public criticism of Communist china for permitting North Korea to employ its airspace, country border, and waters to transfer illicit items to other countries in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.  Criticism from the United Nations has not been forthcoming because China manages to consistently block mention of incidents of non-compliance past the UNSCR 1874 Panel of Experts in their reporting on sanctions implementation. Downplaying obstacles has not resulted in better cooperation, and has arguably made the Chinese more comfortable in doing less.
• The United states of america should go along to intensify its military and counter-proliferation activities past stepping up missile defence force cooperation and combined exercises with Japan and South Korea.  These actions have been successful in getting Beijing to concord to limited sanctions and take other tactical measures following Pyongyang'due south provocations, but not more.
• Another potential route is for the United states to attempt to forge a joint approach with Cathay. If Cathay insists on continuing with its "acupuncture" arroyo—cutting back on items with armed services relevance while deepening investments in infrastructure and resource extraction—perhaps the U.South. could accept this in return for stricter implementation of dual-use trade controls. Ii tracks have always existed in North Korean sanctions: stopping war machine and dual-utilise trade; and punitive measures involving luxury goods, the latter ostensibly with the aim of trying to make information technology more difficult for Kim Jong-Un to reward his loyalists. This arroyo has not been successful given that China's preferred approach is to entice the North Koreans into cooperation by deepening economic ties. The options are either to redouble U.S. efforts to attempt to persuade Beijing to appoint in a more punitive overall trade strategy—a nearly hopeless goal—or to hash out with it trading stricter enforcement of dual-utilize export controls and the like in return for a less castigating overall economic sanctions regime.
• The United States could expand efforts to become as much data virtually the outside earth as possible into North korea through multiple channels; radio and internet broadcasting, investments in internet censorship evasion technologies, transmittal of DVDs, CDs, computer pollex drives, and other means. Kim Jong-un fears this more than sanctions.60 More openly seeking regime change—or at least a major alter in the regime's policies and priorities—is another potential choice.61 While the current arroyo is aimed at inducing change in North Korea'due south behavior, many in the U.S government have become convinced that this is probable to be impossible under the current regime. However, shifting to an outright strategy of regime change—an approach that China categorically rejects—would represent a pregnant shift in the diplomatic framing of U.S. policy towards North Korea.  It would accept very serious implications for any U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea besides as on the larger bilateral relationship.
• The United States should consider supporting limited, targeted engagement with North korea, carried out by non-governmental organizations and UN agencies such as UNICEF. At the very least, people-to-people initiatives, including the long-delayed reciprocal visit to the U.s.a. by the national symphony of the DPRK, should exist encouraged rather than blocked.62 Such initiatives serve the purpose of transmitting data to the Northward Korean people about the outside world. They can also address some purely humanitarian concerns in the areas of public health, child welfare, nutrition, and education. They have the added reward of enhancing U.S. understanding of the North Korean state and may provide early on warning of significant changes in North Korea's policies and priorities.

Finally forging close trilateral cooperation among the U.S., the ROK, and Japan is essential to achieving U.South. objectives of denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Tensions between the ROK and Japan are undermining U.S. security interests in the region every bit Washington struggles to nowadays a united front in dealing with a nuclear North Korea and rise China. Important steps have been taken in recent months to try to encourage reconciliation between Seoul and Tokyo, but at that place is yet more that must be done to facilitate mutual trust and cooperation between these two vital U.Southward. allies. And while Washington does not want to be placed in the position of mediating the difficult territorial and historical problems which have undermined relations between the President Park and Prime number Minster Abe administrations, neither tin can the United states afford to allow the electric current impasse to linger indefinitely.

1 Numerous Western journalists, analysts and officials made such claims. "Former top U.S. official: China getting fed upwardly with Northward Korea," Foreign Policy, 5 April 2013; Marking Landler, "Detecting Shift, U.S. Makes Instance to Prc on N Korea," New York Times, 5 April 2013; "China says 'very firm' with North Korea on nuclear programme: Kerry," Reuters, 1 July 2013; "Obama says China getting tougher on Democratic people's republic of korea," AFP, eighteen June 2013; Sangwon Yoon & Henry Sanderson, "Chinese and Southward Korean Leaders in Accord on Due north Korea," Bloomberg, 27 June 2013.

2 This reassessment was based primarily on Xi Jinping'due south articulation of "3 insists" to North Korean Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae when he visited Beijing in May 2012 as Kim Jong-un'due south personal envoy ("insisting on the denuclearization of the peninsula, insisting on maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula, and insisting on solving relevant issues through dialogue and consultation")  Eleven then made like statements, respectively, to Presidents Obama and Park. Vice President Li Yuanchao reiterated the "three insists" during his July visit to Pyongyang. While Western analysts have construed the listing of denuclearization equally the first "insist" as a reorganization of Chinese priorities, Chinese analysts say that the "three insists" merely represent a verbal description of long-existing Chinese policy and practise not imply that denuclearization overrides stability as a goal.

3 According to 1 analyst, "while denuclearization is a goal, information technology volition be long-term, and cannot come up at the toll of stability." Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, "Red china's North Korea Policy: Backtracking from Sunnylands?", 38 Due north, 2 July 2013. According to another annotator, "We need to work on a large package, a macro solution. We should apply security guarantees to substitution for abandoning the nuclear program. In the process, we cannot easily persuade the DPRK to abandon weapons grade materials but at least we tin can ask it to freeze its nuclear programs and activities." Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, "China's Democratic people's republic of korea Policy: Backtracking from Sunnylands?", 38 North, two July 2013.

4 The phrase "Chinese analysts" is used in order to protect sources. It includes Chinese government officials, regime-affiliated recollect tank representatives, and some academics who regularly advise the authorities and are familiar with its thinking and positions.

5 In addition to creating the problem, Chinese analysts believe the U.S. has missed opportunities in the last two decades by neglecting the issue.

vi  A long list of U.S.-provided security reassurances over the last 2 decades have had no bear on on Pyongyang's or Beijing's policies of blaming Washington. See Victor Cha, The Impossible Country, Democratic people's republic of korea By Nowadays Future, Random House, 2012. From the perspective of North Korea's sŏn'gun (military commencement) ideology, no U.S. security assurance would ever be credible.

vii In the words of a Chinese analyst, "Denuclearization is a long-term objective: getting North Koreans to concur to a testing moratorium would be a meliorate solution." Interview with author, May 2014.

eight Beijing's policy is still based upon the strategic priorities, in descending lodge, of "no war, no instability, no nukes" (不战、不乱、无核). Chinese experts emphasize that while these iii principles reverberate China'south policy priorities vis-à-vis North Korea, they also reflect interim steps as part of an incremental procedure to re‑engage North korea on nuclear disarmament. The three character pairs are seen as having a strong logic and causality, the former beingness a prerequisite of the latter. Mathieu Duchatel and Philip Schell, "China's policy on Democratic people's republic of korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament," SIPRI Policy Newspaper No. 40, Dec. 2013.

nine  Interviews with author, May 2014.

ten  Beijing learned a lesson when its strong reaction to the 2006 nuclear test damaged bilateral relations, and has since deliberately separated its economic and political relationship with Pyongyang from the nuclear issue. "Shades of Carmine: China's Fence over Democratic people's republic of korea," Brussels: International Crisis Group Written report Due north°179, Nov 2009, pp. v-8; 15-17.

eleven According to 1 official, "China has no reason to abandon its whole relationship in exchange for a single issue." Interview with author, May 2014.

12 According to i annotator:  "Since "the perfect goal" of denuclearization cannot be achieved in the short term, nosotros volition need to place phases for how to achieve it. That comes down to how will we increase Democratic people's republic of korea'southward perception of security. Chinese want to see North Korea change sŏn'gun (military first), improve people's livelihood, and that's why China signed up to the Special Economical Zones. Information technology'due south quite challenging for Democratic people's republic of korea to strike a balance between the military machine and economy. If they can slightly tilt towards economic evolution, they can exercise what Red china did in the 1980s. Such a change can be cultivated. How to brand North korea feel slightly secure is vital. Nosotros accept to "induce" Pyongyang to denuclearize." Interview with writer, June 2013.

13 Reforms would require Kim Jong-un to abandon the control economy and renounce the very same country ideologies and political legacies of his father and grandpa, which form the basis of his own legitimacy. And then instead of opening upward its arrangement, Democratic people's republic of korea has engaged in "mosquito net reform," such as that in Rason and other special economic zones, where the goal is to attract foreign investment while preventing contagion of outside influence; creating controls so that in Kim Jong-il'south words, "non even a musquito could get through." Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, "Democratic people's republic of korea: Open for Business?" International Peace Establish, xiii January 2012.

xiv "Democratic people's republic of korea'south external trade reaches record loftier," NKNews, 22 May 2014.  Despite North Korean Political Risks, Sino-DPRK Merchandise Shows Stable Growth, Scott Snyder, Asia Unbound, 26 March 2014.  Go Myong-Hyun, "Economic Comeback in Northward Korea," Asian Plant for Policy Studies Issue Brief No. 58, 10 June 2013. Marcus Noland, "Hugely important: Due north Korea running a current account surplus?" Democratic people's republic of korea: Witness to Transformation, Peterson Institute for International Economics, eighteen March 2013.

15 These ideological considerations take a particular importance for Communist china's ties with North Korea because the Party's International Liaison Department, rather than the Foreign Ministry, has traditionally served as the chief Chinese interlocutor, although that is shifting.

16 Nathan, Andrew J.; Scobell, Andrew, China'southward Search for Security, Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 26

17 Nathan and Scobell, op cit, p. 90.

18 In Beijing's perception, its periphery as well includes the United States whose presence poses the largest single claiming to China's security: "Even though the U.S. is located thousands of miles away, information technology looms as a mighty presence in Red china's neighborhood, with its Pacific Control headquarters in Honolulu; its giant military base of operations on the Pacific island of Guam (6,000 miles from the continental U.S., but only 2,000 miles from China); its dominating naval presence in the South and East People's republic of china Seas; its defense relationships of diverse kinds around China'south periphery […] and its economical and political influence all through the Asian region. If the vast distances that divide the United States from Mainland china prevent China from exerting direct war machine pressure level on information technology, the aforementioned is not true in contrary." Nathan and Scobell, op cit, p. 5.

19 Writer interview with Seong-hyon Lee of Stanford Academy Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, May 2014.

21 The July and December 2010 exercises were also an unwelcome source of domestic pressure, as Netizens criticized the government'south weak response to them. 專家解讀：美霸權釀半島局勢惡化 》 [Skillful estimation: U.S. hegemony worsens the situation in the Peninsula], Hong Kong Wen Wei Po Online, 25 November 2010.

22 Kim Jong-un has been trying to set a course for greater independence from Beijing. Things got off to a rough outset for Red china and North korea immediately upon Kim Jong-il's expiry. China still rallied on behalf of Pyongyang, calling on primal Western and regional countries to support stability, providing significant food aid and sending Vice Foreign Government minister Fu Ying to Pyongyang. Chinese land media supported the transition with highly positive coverage—to the signal that it came under domestic criticism for painting besides rosy a movie of bilateral relations. Despite Prc'southward economic and political support, Kim Jong-un rebuffed early on invitations to visit China, and instead sent high-ranking officials to Singapore, Indonesia, Lao people's democratic republic, Vietnam and Burma/Myanmar to try to drum up investment. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, "The Diminishing Returns of Communist china's Northward Korea policy," 38 North, 16 August 2012.

24 In China'south eyes South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's repudiation of his predecessor Roo Muh-Hyun's North korea policy obstructed progress in the Half dozen-Party Talks because it "irritated" Due north Korea. Chinese analysts as well believe that former Japanese Prime number Minister Junichiro Koizumi's requirement that the resolution of abduction issues be a precondition for normalizing relations between Japan and N Korea also stalled progress at the Half dozen-Party Talks and tied the hands of U.S. also.

25 "Chinese see their country as heir to an 'oriental' strategic tradition that dates back thousands of years and that is pacific, defensive minded, and non-expansionist. They consider China'due south approach to interstate relations ethically fair and reasonable, and they attribute the existence of this unusual approach to the fact that Cathay is a continental power that was historically agrestal and sedentary.  In contrast, they see Western strategic culture as militaristic, offensive minded, and expansionist, growing out of the experience of maritime powers that are mobile and mercantilist."  Nathan and Scobel, p. 91.

26 Lora Saalman, "Balancing Chinese interests on Democratic people's republic of korea and Iran,'" The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, Apr 2013.

27 Interviews with author, May 2014.

29 Chinese nationalists and Netizens continue to demand that the regime use its growing international heft to more actively defend China's global interests through more straight interventionist means. Xi is likely to proceed making efforts to evangelize; and in then doing volition de facto finish the traditional Chinese policy of non-intervention.  Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, "From Japan to the U.S.. China embarks on a bolder foreign policy", op cit.

30 Interview with author, May 2014.

31 Co-ordinate to ane analyst, "The Korean nuclear test is only a game among big powers. This is China'due south best opportunity to negotiate with the U.S. on issues like Primal Asia, Pakistan, the South China Sea and Tibet. China should use the opportunity well." "Shades of Red: Cathay'due south Debate over North korea," op cit., p 8.

32 Co-ordinate to one Chinese analyst, "South People's republic of china Ocean and East China Sea problems are more threatening to Cathay than North korea. Bug in those areas could really hinder Mainland china's development and maritime strategy. The problem is that the U.S. is using the South China Sea and Due east China Ocean to advance its pivot, and so China has to push button back '1 island at a time'; Red china has to utilize maritime disputes to break through U.Due south. containment." Interview with author, May 2014.

34  Interviews with author, Beijing, May 2014.

35 "China seals Bo's fate ahead of Nov viii leadership congress", Reuters, 28 September 2012. "China faces new scandal over crash of a Ferrari," The New York Times, 3 September 2012.

36 While there accept likewise been sporadic reports of fuel and food cut-offs, Chinese officials insist that any reductions take been minimal and in line with their exercise over several years of sending symbolic letters of displeasure to the regime by sometimes making slower deliveries or minimal cuts for a short period of time ("only to send our signal"). Chinese officials insist that these moves are designed not to have any affect on stability or viability of the regime, as the amounts are very small and Northward Korea's food situation is becoming amend; so "what we do for now for is just to make a gesture." These fluctuations fall inside the aforementioned traditional do of Red china's ongoing calibration of help to N Korea; on occasion it sends less food, sends poor quality food, demands above-market prices for grains, and the similar. The moves are all completely reversible. According to i analyst, China always ensures that at that place is plenty "for survival" of the government but not necessarily to make Kim Jong-un too comfortable or enable him to dramatically improve the economic situation. Interviews with author, May 2014. On trade, there are like fluctuations but over time the tendency has been for trade figures to go up; in addition to the huge amount of trade that happens in the grey market uncounted in official statistics.

37 For months subsequently Sunnylands, Chinese and U.Due south. diplomats held relatively productive discussions, which included the commutation of several white papers. While both sides came to agreement on the demand for denuclearization across Yongbyon, the necessary actions and timing to achieve that goal were never agreed upon. Beijing suspended the process following the execution of Jang Song-thaek.

38 Interview with author, May 2014.

39 Built-in in November 1950, weeks after Mainland china sent troops to bring together the Korean War, Li Yuanchao's name originally used characters which meant "to assist Democratic people's republic of korea" (李援朝). He since has changed the last two characters to dissimilar homonyms (李源潮). This issue was widely discussed by Chinese Netizens at the fourth dimension of his visit to Pyongyang (but avoided by state media). Many speculated that the choice of Li was a deliberate reminder of the China-Democratic people's republic of korea traditional friendship and signaled Beijing'south intention of providing continuing assistance to Pyongyang.

42 An instructive case was that of Deng Yuwen, deputy editor of Study Times, a weekly journal of the Central Political party Schoolhouse. In an op-ed piece on 27 February 2013, he argued that China's strategic alliance with Due north Korea was "outdated" and that the wayward ally was no longer useful as a buffer against United States influence. He was removed before long later on following a call from the Foreign Ministry to the Communist Political party'south Central Party School. Jane Perlez, "Editor suspended for article on North korea," New York Times, one April 2013.

44 Relations between the CCP International Liaison Section and Korean Workers Party accept been strained since 2013.

46 Political ties were frozen post-obit Vice President Li Yuanchao'southward visit to Pyongyang in July 2013 for the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War.

47 Interviews with author, April and May 2014.

48  In Resolution 2094 restrictions against the North, including efforts to block the opening of North Korean banks away if they support weapons purchases, are limited by a "credible information" clause, which allows a regime to say that it lacks the data needed to appraise the situation or apply the sanctions. On Resolution 1718 after the start nuclear test in 2006, Beijing negotiated away any threat of military activeness against the North and ensured that inspections of DPRK cargo were not mandatory on member states.  In Resolution 1984 after the 2nd nuclear examination in May 2009, Mainland china weakened the articles on cargo inspections.

49  Both SC Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) explicitly land that they do not prohibit member states from engaging in economic development and humanitarian activities in North korea – which is how Beijing defines its economical interactions.

l Co-ordinate to i Chinese analyst, "when we implement UN sanctions, we demand to take into consideration the security concerns of the N Koreans besides." "Mainland china's North korea Policy: Backtracking from Sunnylands?", op cit. Later on voting in favor of Security Quango Resolution 2094, Chinese Strange Minister, Yang Jiechi stated, "Nosotros always believe that sanctions are not the end of the Security Council actions, nor are sanctions the fundamental style to resolve the relevant issues." Jane Perlez, "Mainland china says it won't forsake North Korea, despite back up for U.N. sanctions," New York Times, ix March 2013.

52 Beijing had sanctions imposed by the USSR in the 1960s considering of its nuclear programme, by the U.South. until the 1970s and after 1989 (Tiananmen), and in the 1990s for missile sales to Pakistan. The U.S. has continued to enforce the sanctions restricting advanced applied science transfers.

52  In 2012, information technology was discovered that the transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) for the DPRK's Hwasŏng-13 (KN-08) displayed during a military parade were fabricated in People's republic of china. Melissa Hanham, North Korea's Procurement Network Strikes Again: Examining How Chinese Missile Hardware Ended Up in Pyongyang, NTI, 31 July 2012. Mainland china blocked any mention of this event by the UNSCR 1874 Panel of Experts in their reporting on sanctions implementation. Mark Hibbs, "Mainland china and the POE DPRK Report," Arms Command Wonk, two July 2012. One month after, 445 graphite cylinders were seized on a Chinese send in Pusan, South Korea in May when information technology was determined that they appeared to be missile parts bound for Syria. Louis Charbonneau, "Suspected North korea missile parts seized en route to Syrian arab republic in May", Reuters, xiv November 2012. Generally speaking, "China constitutes a large gap in the circle of countries that accept approved UNSC Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and are expected to implement them". "Written report regarding North korea Sanction Implementation-Ii", Congressional Enquiry Service, viii October 2010. See also Mary Beth Nikitin et al., "Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874," memorandum to Senator Richard G. Lugar (R–IN), 8 Oct 2010. China has also repeatedly failed to fairly audit DPRK land and sea shipments through its territory.

54 Interview with author, May 2014.

55 Information technology is believed that there was no money in the Foreign Merchandise Bank's (FTB) accounts when they were closed. The U.S. had long pressed China to take straight measures confronting the FTB, and unilaterally sanctioned the bank in March. Washington had sought multilateral sanctions against the FTB, simply China had opposed sanctions at the United nations.

56 See Juan Zarate, Treasury'due south War, New York, 2013. Banco Del Asia held significant N Korean accounts, but was driven into bankruptcy when the U.S. named it an entity of money-laundering concern. Depositors and clients fled fearing the bank would lose correspondent relations with U.Southward. fiscal markets.

57 The Depository financial institution of Communist china operates in the U.S. and would have been vulnerable under Section 311 of the Patriot Deed had it continued dealings with the FTB. "Fire on the Urban center Gate: Why Mainland china Keeps North korea Close", International Crisis Grouping, 9 December 2013, p. 8-nine.

58 Contracting private Chinese companies to serve as middlemen to facilitate "cargo laundering"—a creative process of disassembling components and moving them through unlike logistics routes—enables Northward Korean state trading companies to utilize commercial shipping containers. Budgetary rewards would offer a double payday for some Chinese companies, who could collect the committee fee from a N Korean client as well as the advantage for anonymously providing a re-create of the freight insurance to local authorities in decorated Southeast Asian ports. John S. Park, "The Bound in North korea'south Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor," NBR, December 2012.

60 Scobel and Nathan, op cit.

61 Chinese analysts encounter the U.Due south. equally possessing potent ideological weapons and the willingness to utilise them. "Democracy" and "human rights" are ideas that are accepted everywhere, and the U.S. has gained an outsized ability to define what these ideas mean. Scobel and Nathan, op cit.

62 The World Food Programme, in partnership with other United nations agencies, private international assistance organizations and the Ruddy Cantankerous, should resume carefully monitored food aid deliveries to the DPRK, with an emphasis on trying to reach some of the estimated 120,000 men, women and children incarcerated in the North's prisons. The U.South. should likewise provide more support to some of the best work being done by NGOs on the ground and rather than attempt to stifle Democratic people's republic of korea'southward centre class, the U.South. could selectively target individuals for date.  Frank Jannuzi, "Engage, Don't only Name and Shame," 38 North, 26 March 2014.

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Source: https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/06/testimony-us-china-economic-and-security-review-commission

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